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MAKING SENSE OF GEORGIA'S STATE LAW
PROTECTIONS FOR TRADEMARKS AND
TRADE SECRETS
I. INTRODUCTION
Which law applies? What kind of claim should I bring? What
approach will be the most likely to rectify the wrong I am suffer-
ing? In the realm of trademark law in the state of Georgia, several
avenues may be taken to try to stop someone from utilizing your
idea or mark. Separate state laws govern unfair competition and
deceptive trade practices as well as trade secrets. Compounding
the confusion are the federal laws on the subject which may or may
not be utilized to effectuate a remedy. This Note attempts to
explain the differences among the governing laws of Georgia, to
identify which remedies are available to plaintiffs who believe that
their trademark or trade name is being infringed, and to clarify
what is required to succeed in claims alleging trademark infringe-
ment, violation of anti-dilution provisions, violation of the Georgia
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act or violations of the Georgia
Trade Secrets Act.
Claims arising from the misappropriation of trade secrets are
distinct in nature and will be treated separately in the final section
of this Note. In the past eight years Georgia trade secret law has
been completely overhauled. The end result has been quite
beneficial for the owner of the trade secret. No longer are the
Georgia courts bound by the narrow definition of a trade secret that
for many years kept Georgia out of step with a majority of jurisdic-
tions and left plaintiffs without any real compensation for their
losses. Instead, under the current, broader definition, plaintiffs
may more easily meet the requirements for obtaining relief.
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Part II of this Note addresses unfair competition including such
topics as the remedies available for trademark and trade name
infringement. The concept of dilution is explored, as well as the
purposes behind dilution statutes, namely that the owner of a mark
should have some cause of action when he witnesses the value of
his mark being diminished by the action of others. Lastly, Part III
will address the most permisive of Georgia's provisions, the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
II. UNFAIR COMPETITION
Unfair competition is a form of unlawful business
injury. It consists in passing off, or attempting to
pass off, on the public, the goods or business of one
person as and for the goods or business of another.
It consists essentially in the conduct of a trade or
business in stich a manner that there is either an
express or implied representation to that effect. In
fact, it may be stated broadly that any conduct, the
nature and probable tendency and effect of which is
to deceive the public so as to pass off the goods or
business of one person as and for the goods or
business of another, constitutes actionable unfair
competition.1
In an attempt to promote both commerce and competition, states
have taken various forms of action. By providing multiple means
of enjoining unfair conduct by a party, states may better attain the
goal of promoting real competition by eradicating unfair competi-
tion practices. In Georgia, the legislature has codified the common
law right of trademark protection thereby giving more force to the
long recognized right. In addition, Georgia statutes protect against
the dilution of a distinct mark and outlaw deceptive trade practices.
The legislature enacted each of these statutes with an eye toward
reducing consumer confusion about products and protecting the
owner by emphasizing the value associated with the work required
to build and maintain a name and reputation.
'Multiple Listing Serv., Inc. v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 166 S.E.2d 356, 358 (Ga.
1969) (quoting Atlanta Paper Co. v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 190 S.E. 777, 782-83 (Ga. 1937)).
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A. TRADEMARK
As the symbols of a business's reputation and good-
will, trade names, trademarks and service marks
employed to identify distinctly, by meaning or
association, one's business, products or services are
generally regarded as a species of intangible property
capable of exclusive ownership and entitled to legal
protection from encroachment.2
Many consider the protection of trademarks,3 and trade names4
to be an integral part of both the marketing and distribution of
products, and "[a]s has often been observed, the law of trademark
infringement is but a part of the law of unfair competition."5
Created at common law, trademarks have enjoyed a long history
of both recognition and protection. Therefore, existing statutes
protecting trademarks and providing for their registration are not
essential for obtaining protection, but rather serve to strengthen
the right through statutory title."
1. Georgia's Trademark Law. Georgia's law offering protection
for trademarks is not significantly different from the federal
protection offered by the recently revised trademark law known as
2 27 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEORGIA LAw Trade Names, Trademarks, Copyrights and Unfair
Competition § 3, at 241 (1974).
a'A 'trademark' is a name, sign symbol, or device which is attached to goods offered for
sale in the market so as to distinguish them from similar goods, and to identify them with
a particular trader, or with his successors, as owners of a particular business, as being made,
worked on, imported, selected, certified, or sold by him or them.* 87 C.J.S. Trademarks,
Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition § 1 (1954).
" "Trade-names are names which are used in trade to designate a particular business of
certain individuals considered somewhat as an entity, or the place at which a business is
located, or of a class of goods, but which are not technical trade-marks either because not
applied or affixed to goods sent into the market, or because not capable of exclusive
appropriation by anyone as trade-marks." 87 C.J.S. Trademarks, Trade-Names, and Unfair
Competition § 8 (1954).
" Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031,
1036, 231 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 850 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (citing Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of
Georgia, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 839 (11th Cir. 1983)).
* 87 C.J.S. Trademarks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition § 1, at 219 n.6-15 (1954).
See L.H. Harris Drug Co. v. Stucky, 46 F. 624 (W.D. Pa. 1891) (protecting trademark without
the aid of an authorizing statute).
1997] 309
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the Lanham Act.' Furthermore, state registration of a trademark
provides limited protection within the state. This does not
intimate, however, that state registration of trademarks has no
value. On the contrary, practitioners utilize state registration as
a means of providing notice to those performing research before
attempting to register their own mark. However, under both
Georgia and federal law, the term of registration is ten years, and
the trademark owner may renew registration for successive periods
of ten years.'
Under Georgia trademark law, certain marks are ineligible for
registration.9 A party may not register marks that incorporate
immoral, deceptive or scandalous material.10 The state prohibits
these marks to prevent valueless materials from taking a protected
position among other, more worthy marks. The rationale is that if
the state registers immoral marks, then the state is condoning their
use.
Also ineligible for registration are marks which, "comprise matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons,
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols or bring
them into contempt or disrepute."1' Flags, coats of arms and
insignia of the United States or any other country or municipality
are also unavailable for registration. However, this exclusion does
not bar a county, municipality or board of education from register-
ing its own service mark." Furthermore, the name, portrait or
signature of a living person cannot qualify as a registered mark
without the written consent of the person. 3
The statute enumerates three other general provisions for
exclusion of registration of a mark. These include the following
situations: when the mark is descriptive, resembles a mark
previously registered in Georgia or resembles a mark previously
7 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified as
amended in sections of 15 U.S.C.).
a 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (Supp. 1997) (this statute reduces federal registration from 20 years
to 10); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-445(a) (1989).
9 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-441 (1994).
10 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-441(1) (1994).
" GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-441(2) (1994).
"2 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-441(3) (1994).
Is GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-441(4) (1994).
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registered in the United States Patent Office.1' The forthright-
ness of the statute has forestalled much litigation from arising.
However, subsection five concerning descriptive words has proven
troublesome for potential owners of a mark. The manner in which
the Georgia courts have construed "descriptive" and the necessary
requirements that must be met in order to acquire a secondary
meaning are discussed at length, later in this Note.
2. Trademark Infringement: Tests Under Georgia and Federal
Law. Trademark infringement is a popular claim to bring not only
because of its long history, but also because of the available
remedies. Under Georgia law, sanctions are available for infringe-
ment. The statute provides:
(a) Any owner of a trademark or service mark
registered under this part may proceed by action to
enjoin the manufacture, use, display, or sale of any
counterfeits or imitations thereof; and any court of
competent jurisdiction may grant injunctions to
restrain such manufacture, use, display, or sale as
may be by the court deemed just and reasonable and
may require the defendants to pay to such owner all
14 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-441(5)-(7). These sections provide in full:
(5XA) When applied to the goods or services of the applicant, is merely
descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them; or
(B) When applied to the goods or services of the applicant, is primarily
geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them; or
(C) Is primarily merely a surname; or
(6) Consists of or comprises a trademark or service mark which so
resembles a trademark or service mark registered in this state or a
trademark or service mark or trade name previously used in this state
by another and not abandoned as to be likely, when applied to the goods
or services of the applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive;
or
(7) Consists of or comprises a trademark or service mark which so
resembles a trademark or service mark registered in the United States
Patent Office by another and not abandoned as to be likely, when applied
to the goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion or mistake
or to deceive; provided, however, that, should the applicant prove that
the applicant is the owner of a concurrent registration in the United
States Patent Office of a trademark or service mark covering an area
including this state, the applicant may register such trademark or
service mark under this part.
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profits derived from such wrongful manufacture, use,
display, or sale, and all damages suffered by reason
of such wrongful manufacture, use, display, or sale,
or both profits and damages. The enumeration of
any right or remedy in this part shall not affect a
registrant's right to prosecute under any penal law
of this state.1
a. Georgia's Determination of Liklihood of Confusion.
Seemingly, the test applied by Georgia courts as to whether an
injunction should be granted against an alleged trademark
infringer is whether the public is likely to be deceived."6 Gordy v.
Dunwoody concerned restaurants with similar names operated by
the plaintiff in Atlanta and Athens and the defendant in Macon.17
The Gordy court expounded that "[a]n encroachment upon the
business of another may be made without direct competition."
18
Therefore, in order to establish infringement under existing
trademark laws, there must be a showing of the likelihood of
confusion of some accused mark with the registered mark. In
making such a determination, the courts look at a multitude of
factors which include: the type of trademark, the strength of the
prior owner's mark, the degree of similarity between the two
marks, similarity between the two products, identity of retail
outlets and purchasers, identity of advertising media utilized, the
defendant's intent, and actual confusion."
b. The Test Under Federal Law. Although the test is the same
under federal law, the considerations used to determine infringe-
ment under federal law vary somewhat from the factors used by the
Georgia courts. When operating under federal law, courts consider
the following: similarity in appearance, sound and meaning of the
mark, strength or weakness of the mark, proximity or similarity of
the goods, evidence of actual confusion, the marketing channels
used to market the goods, the type of goods and the degree of care
likely to be exercised by the purchaser, the alleged infringer's
' GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451 (1994).
1' Gordy v. Dunwody, 74 S.E.2d 886, 98 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200 (Ga. 1953).
'
t Id. at 889.
Id. at 891.
"Ackerman Sec. Sys., Inc., v. Design Sec. Sys., Inc., 412 S.E.2d 588, 589 (Ga. App. 1991).
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intent in selecting the mark, and the likelihood of expansion of
product lines.2' Furthermore, in determining whether confusion
on part of the consumer exists so as to constitute an infringement
under federal law, courts are willing to assume likelihood of
confusion based on the showing that the plaintiff's trademark was
intentionally copied by the defendant.2
Furthermore, under federal law, in making the determination of
likelihood of confusion for trademark infringement purposes, the
likelihood is said to be increased where the buyers are either
unsophisticated or else make their purchasing decisions both
quickly and casually. Consider as an example a case involving two
"fast food" restaurants.'
In the case of McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc., both parties
catered to those people wishing to purchase food and eat quickly for
a low cost. The court found that under circumstances which are
likely to exist (i.e. the patrons are in a hurry and want to grab a
quick bite to eat) that the likelihood that there would be confusion
between the two restaurants is more apt to occur than in a
situation where the purchase is expensive or requires some degree
of research or sophistication.' In other words, whereas someone
might put little thought into where they are going to eat lunch,
people will expend much more time and consideration when making
a major purchase. Therefore, customers making the quick,
relatively inconsequential decisions are prone to confusion by
similar marks or names.
The approach utilized by Georgia courts in determining the
existence of infringement differs somewhat from the federal
approach. In Ackerman Security Systems v. Design Security
Sytems,2' the Georgia Court of Appeals held that there is a
presumption raised against confusion if marks have coexisted in
the marketplace for a significant amount of time without any
'* Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 306, 204 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 978 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 684 F.2d 1316, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 588
(9th Cir. 1982).
'Brittingham v. Jenkins, 914 F.2d 447, 455, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121 (4th Cir. 1990).
22 McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1761
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
24 412 S.E.2d 588, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
1997] 313
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evidence of actual confusion. The presumption operates on the
same theory as laches. While it is unfair for one to use a mark
that is substantially the same as one belonging to another, it is
equally unfair to enjoin the second party's use of his mark when it
has been able to coexist in the market without any real harm or
confusion being realized. This presumption may be rebutted,
however, by evidence of other factors which support a finding of a
likelihood of confusion.
3. Trademark Sanctions Under Georgia Law. A 1988 amend-
ment increased the available sanctions for trademark infringement
under Georgia law. Under this amendment, upon a finding of
infringement by a third party of a state registered mark, the
infringer is liable to the owner of the mark "for liquidated damages
in the amount of $10,000.00, if such act has been committed with
knowledge that a trademark or service mark has been registered
... and such act has been committed without previously obtaining
the consent of the owner."' Even though actual damages are
precluded upon an award of liquidated damages, the owner of the
mark benefits because they have a reduced burden of proving
actual damages.2"
Georgia's statutory provisions governing trademarks provide a
strict course of action if the court determines a trademark or
service mark is counterfeit. If such a situation arises, "the court
may order the destruction of all such trademarks or service marks
and all good, articles, or other matter bearing the trademarks or
service marks, which are in the possession or control of the court
or any party to the action .... 27 The statute further provides
that upon a showing of good cause and a probability of success on
the merits, the court may order seizure of the counterfeit goods
from persons "manufacturing, displaying for sale, or selling the
goods.... ."2
Utilization of the seizure provisions is not to be taken lightly.
The statute attaches liability to any person who causes the seizure
2s Act of Apr. 11, 1988, No. 1369, § 2, 1988 Ga. Laws 1458, 1458-59 (codified as amended
at GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-450 (1994)).
26GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-450 (1994).
27 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(c) (1994).
28 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(dXl) (1994).
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of non-counterfeit goods. 2' As with other portions of the trade-
mark statute, while it is not determinative to establish a cause of
action, acting in bad faith generally involves stiffer penalties.
B. TRADE NAMES
Protection is available for trade names as well as trademarks.
As the Georgia Supreme Court explained: "[a] trademark differs
from a trade name in that the former identifies a product or its
manufacturer but not the owner of the business selling it, while the
latter primarily identifies the owner or operator of a business and
may, but need not, identify the products handled."' Because of
the overlap of trademarks and trade-names, the two are often
confused and even the courts sometimes use the terms interchange-
ably. 1 Still, the Georgia Supreme Court has recognized that a
difference exists between the two.
Trade-names are broader in scope than trademarks, and many
describe trade-names as appealing to the ear more so than to the
eye. Typically, trade-names are characterized as being either fixed
or transitory. Fixed trade-names mean the name is itself attached
to a particular place without regard to the owner, while a transito-
ry trade-name follows the person with whom it is associated
wherever the person is located.32
Trade-names may also be exclusive or nonexclusive. Protection
of exclusive trade-names is treated like protection of trademarks,
while nonexclusive trade-names are thought of as if they belong to
the public.
2 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(eX1) (1994). Section 10-1-451(eXl) provides that the liability
occasioned will equal:
(A) Any damages proximately caused to any person having a financial
interest in the seized goods by the seizure of goods which are not
counterfeit;
(B) Costs incurred in defending against seizure of noncounterfeit goods;
and
(C) Upon a showing that the person causing the seizure to occur acted
in bad faith, expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees expended in
defending against the seizure of any noncounterfeit or noninfringing
goods.
Gordy v. Dunwoody, 74 S.E.2d 886, 887 (Ga. 1953).
81 Children's Bootery v. Sutker, 107 So. 345 (Fla. 1926).
2 87 C.J.S. Trademarks, Trade-names, and Unfair Competition § S (1954).
1997] 315
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In 1983, in a case of first impression, the Georgia Supreme Court
held that the right to use a trade name was a property right and
therefore the court could foreclose upon that right.' In Reis v.
Ralls, the plaintiff, Reis, sold the business known as Atlanta
Refrigeration Service Co., Inc. to the defendant, Ralls. The sale
agreement explicitly stated that the buyers were to acquire the
name of the corporate seller. Because of a subsequent breach of the
lease by the defendants, the plaintiff foreclosed on the property.
The defendants then began doing business as and advertising
under the names of both Atlanta Air Conditioning, Inc., and
Atlanta Refrigeration Co. The plaintiffs then filed suit seeking the
money owed to them by the defendants as well as an injunction
barring their use of the name Atlanta Refrigeration Co. due to its
similarity to the name Atlanta Refrigeration Service Co."
In making its determination, the court initially looked to
applicable trademark law, and noted that trademarks, like other
forms of property, may be transferred.' The court then stated,
"[w]e find this statement of the law as to trademarks applicable to
trade names where the business of a corporation, including its
name, but not the corporation is sold. 3  The court next performed
an analysis of the governing Uniform Commercial Code article.37
Beginning with the premise that a trade name is a form of
intangible property, the court concluded that the trade name along
with the good will represented thereby may be the subject of an
Article 9 interest.
The Georgia Supreme Court in Multiple Listing Service, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc.s held that the defendant had
infringed a real name because defendant's name constituted a
colorable imitation of a name that the general public, exercising
3 Reis v. Rails, 301 S.E.2d 40 (Ga. 1983).
34 Id. at 41-42.
35 Id. at 42 (citing 27 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEORGIA LAW Trade Names, Trademarks,
Copyrights and Unfair Competition, § 3, at 384 (1974).
36 Reis, 301 S.E.2d at 42.
" The court utilized the 1972 Official Comment to UCC § 9-106 which says, 'the term
'general intangibles' brings under this Article miscellaneous types of contractual rights and
other personal property which are used or may become customarily used as commercial
security. Examples are goodwill, literary rights and rights to performance. Other examples
are copyrights, trademarks and patents." Reis. 301 S.E.2d at 42-43.
159 S.E.2d 52 (Ga. 1968).
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ordinary care, might believe was the name of the original holder.39
The standard for infringement is the same as the standard applied
under Georgia trademark law. The court further held that the use
of such name constitutes a fraud against the one entitled to use it,
"when the infringer intends to create the impression in the minds
of the public that he and the person or corporation first appropriat-
ing the name are the same. °
In Multiple Listing Service, the plaintiffs had been operating
under the name Multiple Listing Service or "MLS" for ten years
before the defendant filed for registration of the name Metropolitan
Multiple Listing Service.'" In that time, the plaintiffs had spent
$1,434,773.95 on advertising, 90% of which included either "MLS",
"Multiple Listing Service" or both.'2 Also during this ten year
period, the plaintiff had listed 15,141 houses, and in each of these
yards, located primarily in the Atlanta, Decatur and Marietta
metropolitan areas, the plaintiffs sign bore the names "MLS" and
"Multiple Listing Service.' Under these circumstances, the court
held that secondary meaning had been acquired by the plaintiffs
use and therefore the name deserved protection. Because of the
competitive nature of business in which both parties were engaged,
the court held that the plaintiff would inevitably suffer irreparable
injury unless injunctive relief was granted."
C. ANTI-DILUTION
The anti-dilution statute represents another remedy available to
holders of trademarks and trade-names that are being infringed.
The Georgia anti-dilution statute provides protection of trademarks
and trade-names even if there is no competition between the
parties or actual confusion among the public as to the source of the
products. The basis for a cause of action under the anti-dilution
statute as explained by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, "is the belief that the owner of these
sId
40 Id. at 54 (quoting Saunders Sys. v. Drive It Yourself Co., 123 S.E. 132, 135 (Ga. 1924)).41 Multiple Listing Service, 159 S.E.2d at 52-53.
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marks should not have to stand by and watch the diminution in
their trademark's value as a result of unauthorized uses by
others."' The statute provides:
Every person, association, or union of working men
adopting and using a trademark, trade name, label,
or form of advertisement may proceed by action; and
all courts having jurisdiction thereof shall grant
injunctions to enjoin subsequent use by another of
the same or any similar trademark, trade name,
label, or form of advertisement if there exists a
likelihood of injury to business reputation or of
dilution of the distinctive quality of the trademark,
trade name, label, or form of advertisement of the
prior user, notwithstanding the absence of competi-
tion between the parties or of confusion as to the
source of goods or services, except that this Code
section shall not deprive any party of any vested
lawful rights acquired prior to March 4, 1955.46
Georgia courts have consistently interpreted "distinctive quality"
to mean that the trade name must be capable of exclusive appropri-
ation. In a recent Georgia Supreme Court case, Justice Sears
wrote, "[it is well established that descriptive words or phrases are
incapable of exclusive appropriation, and are not entitled to
protection as a mark or name unless the party seeking relief
establishes that the word or phrase has acquired a secondary
meaning due to (1) its use in connection with the business or trade
of the party seeking relief, and (2) the public's understanding,
through such use, that the word or phrase designates the goods,
services, or business of that party."
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (1994).
'
7 Future Professionals, Inc. v. Darby, 470 S.E.2d 644, 646 (Ga. 1996). See Giant Mart
Corp. v. Giant Discount Foods, Inc., 279 S.E.2d 683, 686,217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 189 (Ga. 1981)
(finding the word "Giant incapable of exclusive appropriation but the phrase "Giant
Discount Foods" to be a properly acquired trade name entitled to protection); Dolphin Homes
Corp. v. Tocomc Dev. Corp., 156 S.E.2d 45,47-48, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 543 (Ga. 1967) (ruling
the trade-name, Old National East, did not have secondary meaning because no facts were
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The test, under federal law, for establishing secondary meaning
for descriptive words and phrases is not dramatically different from
the one employed by the Georgia courts. Federal courts consider
several factors in order to determine whether a secondary meaning
for a symbol or device has been achieved. These factors include the
following: whether or not the actual purchasers of the product
associate the trademark with the producer; the amount and type of
advertising done under the mark; the length and manner of use to
which the trademark has been subject; and whether the use has
been exclusive." The court in Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission
Parts Corp. further explained that in order to achieve secondary
meaning, the primary inquiry concerns the purchaser's attitude.49
The producer must be of the utmost significance, even more
significant than the product itself.5°
There are two forms typically recognized by both commentators
and the courts that dilution may take. The first of these is
"blurring" or "whittling down" of the distinctive quality of a mark.
An example of blurring is when a mark is widely seen on all
different types of products so that it is not associated with any
particular item, but various items. A mark may lose its entitle-
ment to protection if such blurring is allowed to continue unabated
for a significant length of time. This is possible because the very
nature of a mark is that the mark must be distinctive in order to
warrant protection. Once a mark loses its distinctiveness, it is no
longer worthy or even capable of protection.
The second manifestation of dilution is the "tarnishment" of a
product. Tarnishment occurs when a mark is used by one in such
a way that it creates an unfavorable association with the producer's
alleged which showed the public associated the trade-name with the business of plaintiffs
corporation); Saunders Sys. Atlanta Co. v. Drive It Yourself Co.,123 S.E. 132, 135 (Ga. 1924)
(stating words descriptive of the goods, service, or place where they are made may by long
use in connection with the business of the particular trade, come to be understood by the
public as designating the goods, service, or business of a particular trader).
"Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1015; 227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 598 (Cal. 1985). See also American Television & Communications Corp. v. American
Communications & Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546; 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2084 (Fla. 1987)
(holding that the district court's determination that evidence failed to show that corporate
name had acquired secondary meaning with any relevant group was not clearly erroneous).
49 Transgo, 768 F.2d at 1014.
50 Id. at 1015.
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mark. An example of a successful dilution suit based on tarnish-
ment theory is discussed below in Original Appalachian Artworks
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.5 '
In order to sustain a successful action under the Georgia anti-
dilution statute, the plaintiff must show that the marks in question
are similar and that the contested use is likely to injure the
plaintiff's commercial reputation or dilute the distinctive quality of
its marks. In Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,52 the Fifth
Circuit found that the plaintiff failed to meet the necessary
requirements under the statute.5 In Amstar, the plaintiff argued
that Domino's Pizza infringed on their trademark of "Domino"
which was used in conjunction with the sale of sugar and salt. The
court held that not only were the two marks not confusing, but also
that "Domino" had become a weak mark and was therefore outside
the plaintiff's line of products." Perhaps if the defendant in this
case had been marketing pepper or other spices under the name of
Domino, the court would have found in the plaintiff's favor. As it
was, pizza delivery, although still in the same genre of food
advertising, was too far removed from the business of marketing
sugar/salt products.
A Hawaii case similar to the "Domino" case yielded the same
results as the Fifth Circuit applying Georgia law. In Carrington v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,' the court found that the plaintiffs regis-
tered word "Sunspots" when used in conjunction with its stationery
and greeting card business was unlikely to be confused with
defendant's use of "Sun Spots" for a clothing line." As in the
Domino case, the two products were found to be too dissimilar with
only a small possibility of confusion among the consumers.57
The statute did serve as the basis of relief for the plaintiffs in
Original Appalachian Artworks Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc."
Here, the court held that in order to prevail under a dilution claim
51 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
615 F.2d 252,205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
SId.
541d. at 265.
"683 P. 2d 1220, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1338 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984).
"Id.
57Id.
" 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
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where it is alleged that the same or similar mark has been used in
a way that creates an undesirable, unwholesome or unsavory
association with the plaintiffs mark, the plaintiff must show that
the marks in question are similar and either that their commercial
reputation is likely to be harmed or else that their mark's distinc-
tiveness will be diluted.5"
In this case, the court ruled that the defendant's Garbage Pail
Kids were disparaging to the reputation and wholesome image that
the plaintiffs Cabbage Patch Kids were trying to project and
protect. The defendant itself admitted that it was borrowing from
the plaintiffs good will and making Cabbage Patch Kids the butt
of their joke.e Behavior such as the defendant's is clearly imper-
missible under the tarnishment portion of the anti-dilution statute.
The federal anti-dilution statute has its own set of criteria which
must be met in order for relief to be granted."1 Generally, it is
easier to maintain an action under Georgia's law than under the
federal law which is one reason that the Georgia anti-dilution
statute is so attractive. Furthermore, the remedy of an injunction
of the offending use is the same under both, so it seems unneces-
sary to utilize the federal dilution statute in Georgia. Georgia law
is more permissive for bringing claims and the relief available
under both statutory schemes is identical. However, Georgians
" Id. at 1039.
® Id. at 1040.
61 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(cXl) (West Supp. 1997) lists the factors which may be considered
in determining whether there is a cause of action under dilution. These include:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is
used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark
is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and
channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against
whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(cX1) (West Supp. 1997).
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should still be aware of the availability and components of the
federal statute for purposes of diversity claims.
D. UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
A state derives its ability to enact legislation for the purpose of
securing fair trade practices from its police power. As long as
Constitutional lines are not crossed, states may regulate trade so
as to prohibit fraud, deception and other commercial activities
which may act to stifle competition. In the 1960's and 1970's many
states (including Georgia) passed deceptive trade statutes for these
purposes. Many of these statutes, in an effort to prevent their
circumvention, do not define what constitutes "unfair," "deceptive"
or "fraudulent" practices with any specificity. As a result, the
factual circumstances which surround each individual case have
proven determinative.6 2
The Georgia Assembly enacted the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act ("UDTPA")63 in 1968 to afford another source of
relief for victims of trademark or trade name infringement. While
the UDTPA, does not preclude other actions from being pursued
concurrently," the only remedy it offers those seeking relief is an
injunction.'
In addition to an injunction, the statute does provide for costs to
be awarded to the prevailing party under certain situations, and
the court, in its discretion, may also award attorney's fees. If the
court finds that the complaining party knowingly brought a
groundless suit, costs and attorney's fees may be awarded to the
defendant. 66 But, the defendant may also be assessed costs if the
court finds that he engaged in willful deceptive trade practice.67
' Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Practices Forbidden by State Deceptive Trade Practice
and Consumer Protection Acts, 89 A.L.R. 3d 449, 458 (1979).
63 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-370-375 (1994).
"See Diedrich v. Miller & Meier and Assoc., Architects and Planners, Inc., 334 S.E.2d
308, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1052 (Ga. 1985) (holding that the Uniform Trade Practices Act did
not displace the common law right to protection of trade names, but instead expressly
preserved the common law rights).
6 Lauria v. Ford Motor Co., 312 S.E.2d 190, 193 (Ga. App. 1983).
6 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-373(bXl) (1994).
7 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-373(bX2) (1994).
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1. Benefits of the UDTPA. One of the major benefits of the
UDTPA is that the requirements for obtaining an injunction under
it are the least stringent of all other Georgia code sections that
seek to protect trade names and trademarks. In order to obtain
relief, the plaintiff need not prove direct competition or actual
confusion. "All that is required is that the use of a name cause
confusion to others using reasonable care.' Furthermore, the
UDTPA does not require a party seeking relief to have registered
the relevant trade or service mark name69 whereas registration is
a prerequisite for relief under other Code sections.70 The ease of
obtaining relief under the UDTPA makes it one of the most often
pleaded grievances by plaintiffs seeking to protect their mark.
However, in recent history many did not view the UDTPA as very
accessible due to the confusion caused by the decision of the
Georgia Supreme Court in Elite Personnel, Inc. v. Elite Personnel
Services, Inc.71 In this case, the defendant, Elite Personnel, Inc.,
had begun using the name "Elite Personnel" in October of 1987.
The plaintiff, Elite Personnel Services, Inc., however, was not
incorporated until six months later in April of 1988. Although
defendant had clearly been using the name for a longer period of
time, the court affirmed the lower court's position enjoining the
defendant from using the name.72 The court reasoned that the
defendant's failure to register the mark precluded them from using
it. 73
This segment of Elite Personnel was later expressly overruled by
the Georgia Supreme Court. In Future Professionals, Inc. v.
Darby 4 the court held that "[w]hile the registration of a trade-
mark or service mark is a prerequisite for relief under certain other
sections of the Code, UDTPA does not require a party seeking relief
thereunder to have registered the relevant trade or service mark or
' Giant Mart Corp. v. Giant Discount Foods, Inc., 279 S.E.2d 683, 686, 217 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 189 (Ga. 1981).
Id. at 685.
70 Diedrich, 334 S.E.2d 308, 311 (Ga. 1985). See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-450-51 (1994)
(listing registration as a prerequisite for relief).
7' 378 S.E.2d 117 (Ga. 1989), overruled in part by Future Profl, Inc. v. Darby, 470 S.E.2d
644 (Ga. 1996).
7 Id. at 119.73 id.
7 470 S.E.2d 644 (Ga. 1996).
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name. To the extent this court ruled otherwise in Elite Personnel
v. Elite Personnel Services, that opinion is hereby overruled."75
The portion of the decision in Elite Personnel which continues to
be good law concerns the mark's characteristics. In Elite Personnel,
the court held that the trial court was correct, "in finding that the
term 'Elite Personnel' is descriptive in nature and incapable of
exclusive appropriation in the absence of a secondary meaning."76
The court noted that to acquire secondary meaning the name must
be used over time so "that the name has become associated with a
particular business or product."7 7 The court held that the six
month period in this case was too short for any secondary meaning
to have arisen.78
Even more troubling is the final paragraph of this Georgia
Supreme Court decision. In these last statements, the court
assumes that since the Secretary of State granted Articles of
Incorporation to the defendant after the plaintiff was incorporated
that "presumably the Secretary of State found the name sufficiently
distinguishable for corporate purposes."7 '9 Based on this assump-
tion, the court held that the defendant may continue to use the
name Elite Personnel for corporate purposes (as distinguished from
trade or business purposes).'
2. Caselaw Interpreting the UDTPA. Much of the other case law
that has developed as a result of deceptive trade practice statutes
revolves around the disputed lawfulness of activity where the
statute in question provides only a general definition for unfair or
deceptive acts creating a likelihood of confusion. As a general rule,
courts are more willing to find a violation of the statute in situa-
tions where there is a greater opportunity for confusion. The
federal case, Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc.,"
("Rolls-Royce") illustrates this point by interpreting and applying
Georgia law. Here, the court held that a violation of Georgia's
7'Id. at 646.
76 Elite Personnel, Inc. v. Elite Personnel Serv., Inc., 378 S.E.2d 117, 119 (Ga. 1989),





8' 428 F. Supp. 689, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 35 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
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deceptive trade practices act was established by the evidence. 2
The defendant in Rolls-Royce sold plastic and fiberglass products.
The controversy arose over defendant's manufacturing of car
customizing kits which included both a simulated grill and hood
ornament quite similar to the plaintiff's registered trademark Rolls-
Royce grill and hood ornament. In fact, the court held that the
defendant's product was too similar and enjoined the defendant
from the manufacture of the product.' The court stated that the
likelihood of confusion was readily apparent by simple visual
examination of the defendant's merchandise and the protected
mark of the plaintiff.8"
The Fifth Circuit interpreted Georgia's law to require an
apparent (or "obvious") likelihood of confusion. However, using a
twist on this approach in an earlier case applying Florida's
deceptive practices act, the same court had made the opposite
determination. In Holiday Inns, Inc., v. Holiday Out in America'
the Fifth Circuit found that where there was an absence of a
likelihood of confusion, no violation of the statute occurred.w The
defendant in this case was the operator of campground facilities
utilizing marks such as "Holiday Out," "Holiday Out in America,"
and "The Nation's Campground," while the plaintiff operated a
chain of motels whose marks included "Holiday Inn," "Holiday Inn
of America," and "The Nation's Innkeeper." Despite plaintiff's
claim of confusion, the court granted no relief.8 7 Though the
court's conclusion here is certainly questionable, it serves to
emphasize that the stronger the chance for confusion among
consumers, the better the chance the plaintiff has to stop the
offending conduct.
3. Injunctions for Unauthorized Use of Family Name. In Baker
Realty Co. v. Baker,' the court held that the UDTPA authorizes
injunctions restraining even the use of a family name that has been
saId.
"Id.
I4 d. at 695.
481 F.2d 445, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257 (5th Cir. 1973).
"Id.
8 Id. at 450.
"187 S.E.2d 850, 174 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 36 (Ga. 1972).
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appropriated as a trade-name.89 In this case, Baker Realty
Company sued Baker to enjoin him from operating under the name
Baker Realty Associates." The plaintiff was authorized to act as
a real estate agent and broker within the metropolitan area of
Atlanta, while the defendants operated solely in Clayton county.91
Defendant claimed that he was the only Baker acting as a broker
in that area, and further argued that he was using his own name
both reasonably and honestly.' The court held that even though
Baker was the defendant's family name, when looking at all the
surrounding circumstances, "such as the other descriptive words of
the trade name, the type of business carried on, the geographical
area in which the trade name has acquired a meaning, and other
distinguishing factors, there remains a likelihood of confusion and
misunderstanding among the general public." 3 Therefore, the
plaintiff prevailed in its claim to enjoin the defendant from using
his family name to sell real estate in Atlanta.
A Colorado case provides a similar outcome with regard to the
use of a family name for a corporation, although the case itself
implies that the prohibition of the use of a family name previously
registered to someone else only extends to an actual corporation."
The court held, "the right of an individual to use his own name in
business does not extend to the use of a family name by a corpora-
tion."'5 The chosen language leads to the conclusion that in other
business settings more than one entity can operate under a
common family name even where one party has previously
registered it.
The decision of the Georgia court appears to be the more logical
of the two decisions. Corporate identity should not be the disposi-
tive factor. Instead, the rationale of the Georgia court in Baker
which focused primarily on factors such as the likelihood of
confusion and area of operation as well as the type of services,
9Id.
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should be the basis for a decision to enjoin the use of a family
name. In fact, the Colorado Court of Appeals looked at these
factors in issuing the injunction against the defendant corporation.
Why such limitations on usage of a family name apply only when
dealing with corporations is inexplicable.
E. GEORGIA STATUTES PROVIDE CONCURRENT REMEDIES
The UDTPA, antidilution statute and codification of the common
law protection of trademarks are a few of the steps taken by the
Georgia legislature to ensure the protection of intellectual property.
These various means of enjoining and sometimes punishing unfair
conduct by a party are not mutually exclusive. Bringing one claim
does not preclude asserting them all concurrently. These statutes,
together and separately, serve as protectionary measures designed,
not only to secure an individual's ideas and work associated with
those ideas, but also to promote commerce and competition within
the state. In prohibiting one party from appropriating another's
ideas with impunity, the state implicitly recognizes the importance
of hard work in building a good reputation.
Furthermore, an equally important by-product of these statutes
is the reduction of consumer confusion about products. It is a
legitimate state goal to ensure that the consumers of the state
know what they are purchasing and from whom. Georgia has
provided its residents, visitors and those conducting business in the
state a genuine service through its laws protecting trademarks and
trade-names. By punishing those who would abuse the notions of
fair competition and, whether willfully or innocently appropriate
ideas and merchandizing techniques not uniquely their own,
Georgia has created a fair and honest consumer environment.
III. TRADE SECRETS
The unique nature of trade secrets makes them equally worthy
of protection as trademarks and trade-names. Trade secrets
include information that is so sensitive as to require extra mea-
sures of protection to ensure that the owner's rights in his property
are not violated. Relatively recent actions by the Georgia legisla-
ture have improved the ability of trade secret owners to protect
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their property. The new and clear parameters outlined in the
statute governing trade secrets allow for a cause of action upon a
showing of value of what is to be protected and that the owner has
taken measures to protect the secrecy of the formula, program or
whatever other information sought to be guarded.
Until the passage of the 1989 Trade Secret Act, and subsequently
the 1990 Trade Secret Act, Georgia law regarding trade secrets was
not in accord with the majority of states. Prior to 1989, Georgia
law used the narrow definition of trade secrets as provided by
Corpus Juris Secundum which was as follows: "[a] trade secret,
within the rules pertaining to the rights which may be protected by
injunction, is ... a plan, process, tool, mechanism, or compound,
known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it
must be confided in order to apply it to the uses intended."' The
more widely accepted definition of trade secret as provided by § 757
of the Restatement of Torts was expressly rejected by the Georgia
Supreme Court as too broad.97
The practical reality of the accepted definition of a trade secret
in Georgia before 1989 was that in order to get protection under the
law, there had to be close to absolute secrecy. However, the courts
were willing to grant relief under theories which emphasized the
circumstances of the misappropriation. Fiduciary duties of agents
and officers of corporations, contractual measures such as restraint
from competition agreements and certain forms of tort liability such
as fraud and coercion were all theories under which the Georgia
courts would grant relief when the action did not fall under the
narrow provision for trade secrets.
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of the former regime was the
distinction made by the courts between "trade secrets" and
"confidential information." Remedies and degrees of protection
were determined by into which of the two categories the material
was placed." For example, trade secrets were protectable as long
9 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 151(a) (1978).
" Textile Rubber & Chem. Co. v. Shook, 255 S.E.2d 705, 707-08,208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352
(Ga. 1979).
" See Peter C. Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information Under Georgia
Law, 19 GA. L. REV. 623, 645-70 (1985) (stating that each type of information receives
distinctly different legal protection).
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as they were not duplicatable by legitimate means.99 All that was
required for protection of confidential information was an enforce-
able contractual or otherwise confidential relationship."°  The
criteria used in the Georgia courts' decisions distinguishing
between trade secrets and confidential information was fuzzy,
further complicating matters.
The Georgia Trade Secrets Act of 1990 (the "Act") 1 replaced
the statute adopted in 1989, which was the first attempt by the
Georgia legislature at a broader definition of trade secrets. The
definition adopted in 1989 was based on the definition as provided
in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA), 10 2 and it focused on
information with economic value which was maintained in compar-
ative secrecy. The new definition also contained an illustrative list
of what qualified under the definition of trade secret. 0 3 In
departing from the previously recognized Corpus Juris Secundum
definition, the 1989 Act required only relative secrecy.
The Georgia legislature amended the 1989 Act the following year.
The current definition under the 1990 Act, which is a more
modified version of the UTSA, illustrates which information may
now qualify as a trade secret under Georgia law.0 4 The defini-
tion now in use brings Georgia law in step with a majority of other
jurisdictions. No longer are the courts confined to such a narrow
construction of what may be protected as a trade secret. Further-
more, under the current definition, clearer parameters have been
" Thomas v. Best Mfg. Corp., 218 S.E.2d 68, 71 (Ga. 1975).
'00 Durham v. Stand-By Labor, Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 149 (Ga. 1973).
101 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-760-767 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
02 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
10 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-760(a) (1989) (repealed 1990).
The relevant portion of the statute reads as follows:
"Trade Secret" means information, without regard to form, including, but
not limited to, technical or nontechnical data, a formula, a pattern, a
compilation, a program, a device, a method, a technique, a drawing, a
process, financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list of actual
or potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly known by or
available to the public and which information:
(A) Derives economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use; and
(B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstanc-
es to maintain its secrecy.
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-761(4) (1996).
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provided for the definition of a trade secret. Now a plaintiff need
only establish two criteria in order to gain protection for a trade
secret: value and the measures taken for secrecy.
Under the new law of trade secrets in Georgia, the distinction
between confidential information and trade secret will no longer be
necessary or valid. The Act is broad enough that confidential
information has been swallowed up by the general definition of
trade secret. The current, accepted definition of trade secret
includes information that was previously held by Georgia courts to
constitute only confidential information. °5
A. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW SCOPE OF TRADE SECRET
Since the passage of the Act, the Georgia Supreme Court has had
a few occasions to interpret its impact on the common law treat-
ment of trade secrets. For example, in Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Labora-
tories, Inc.,"° the Georgia Supreme Court held that the common
law distinction whereby employer's customer lists were the property
of the employer but the employee's personal knowledge was not
protected by trade secret law, was still in effect. 7 This is so
because the Act does not expressly obviate this distinction.0 8
" 'IS]tatutes are not understood to effect a change in the common
law beyond that which is clearly indicated by express terms or by
necessary implication.' "'0 The court reasoned that a broader
definition of trade secrets which included all forms of customer
"information" instead of the specifically enumerated "customer lists"
would be necessary in order to obviate the common law distinc-
tion. 110 However, since the Act is not so broadly drawn, a person
leaving employment still has the right to take with him the skill
and knowledge he has obtained during the course of that employ-
ment in the absence of any contractual restraint.
Id.
10 437 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 1993).
o'0 Id. at 305. See also Vendo Co. v. Long, 102 S.E.2d 173, 175 (Ga. 1958) (holding that
"[a] person who leaves the employment of another has a right to take with him all the skill
he has acquired, all the knowledge he has obtained, and all the information that he has
received, so long as nothing is taken that is the property of the employer.").
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The court reaffirmed this position in Leo Publications, Inc. v.
Reid... and held that only the tangible customer lists were the
property of the former employer and warranted protection as trade
secrets."' In Leo, the defendant was an advertising director for
the plaintiff, and before she left her job, she compiled a list of
customers to leave for her successor which included contact
persons, telephone numbers, and information regarding the type
and amount of advertising done by these clients. After leaving the
plaintiff's employ, she began publishing an advertising paper of her
own that competed with plaintiff's paper. The plaintiff sought an
injunction against the defendant's use of customer lists obtained
while working for the plaintiff. The trial court found for the
defendant, concluding that the list was not a trade secret because
the information it contained was readily ascertainable by proper
means. However, the court did order the defendant to return the
original list she compiled if indeed it was in her possession.113
B. REMEDIES UNDER GEORGIA TRADE SECRET LAW
Under the Act there are several different remedial actions
available for one whose trade secret is misappropriated. "
Obtaining an injunction of either an actual or threatened misappro-
priation of a trade secret is one action that may be pursued."5
Under the Act, the injunction terminates when the trade secret is
no longer in existence, but it may be continued for a reasonable
amount of time if the trade secret "ceases to exist due to the fault
of the enjoined party or others by improper means."116 The Act
further provides that under "exceptional circumstances" a court
may order the wrongdoer to pay reasonable royalties to the owner
of the trade secret if it would be unreasonable to prohibit future
use. 
117
... 458 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1995).1
"
2 Id. at 652.
114 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-762 -63 (1994).
115 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-762(a) (1994).
116 Id.
"7 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-762(b) (1994). This section further states, [elxceptional
circumstances include, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position
prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that renders a
prohibitive injunction inequitable." Id.
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The Act also authorizes damages to be recovered either in
conjunction with obtaining an injunction or as the sole remedial
measure taken."1 Under the Act, "[diamages can include both
the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrich-
ment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in
computing actual loss."119 Upon failure to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence either damages or unjust enrichment, the Act
authorizes the court to award "a reasonable royalty for a misappro-
priator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret for no
longer than the period of time for which use could have been
prohibited.""2 Under circumstances such as these, it is expected
that the court will determine what license price negotiations
between the parties would have yielded. For example, a district
court in Florida looked to uncompleted negotiations between the
owner of the trade secret and the misappropriator to reach its
finding of a reasonable royalty.121
In University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp.,' 22 the
following factors were used in determining the fair license price:
the resulting and foreseeable changes in the parties'
competitive posture; the prices past purchasers or
licensees may have paid; the total value of the secret
to the plaintiff, including the plaintiffs development
costs and the importance of the secret to the plain-
tiffs business; the nature and extent of the use the
defendant intended for the secret; and finally what-
ever other unique factors in the particular case
which might have affected the parties' agreement,
such as the ready availability of alternative process-
es. 
1 23




" Biodynamic Technologies, Inc. v. Chattanooga Corp., 658 F. Supp. 266, 270 (S.D. Fla.
1987).
504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Hughes Tool Co. v. G.W. Murphy Indus. Inc., 491
F.2d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1973)).
1" University Computing, 504 F.2d at 539.
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As the Fifth Circuit illustrates in University Computing, there is
some flexibility available in determining the cost of the license to
be utilized.
Under the Act, exemplary damages may be awarded by the court
upon a finding of willful and malicious misappropriation in an
amount that is not to exceed twice the amount of any award under
subsection (a)."U This provision is the final one of the Act which
authorizes damages to be paid to the plaintiff. If the owner of the
trade secret is unable to demonstrate any of the preceding require-
ments, then he will have exhausted the available remedial
provisions and find no relief in the statutory scheme.
Criminal penalties are not provided for in the Act, but it does
expressly reference Section 16-8-13 of the Georgia Code which
addresses criminal offenses pertaining to the theft of a trade
secret."2 The Act does purport to "[e]xcept as provided in subsec-
tion (b) ... supersede conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other
laws of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of
a trade secret.1 26 Laws which are not affected include contractu-
al duties or remedies and other civil remedies not based on
misappropriation of a trade secret. 12
7
The current statutory regime employed in Georgia and as
interpreted by the courts is a large advancement from where the
law on trade secret was less than ten years ago. The broader
definition affords owners some real protection from having their
work illegally appropriated. Furthermore, although trade secrets
are discoverable during litigation, the 1990 Act provides for
protection of an alleged trade secret through "reasonable means,
which may include granting protective orders in connection with
discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the
records of the action, and ordering any person involved in the
litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court
approval.""2 This provision acts to increase the possibility that
a party suspecting misappropriation of their trade secret will come
forward and seek relief. Without such measures to maintain
124 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-763(b) (1994).
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1.767(bX3) (1994).
' GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-767(a) (1994).
L GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-767(bX1)-(2) (1994).
's GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-765 (1994).
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secrecy during trial, an owner would likely be hesitant in bringing
a suit for fear that legal action would result in forfeiture of the
right to the trade secret because of forced disclosure in court.
The statute of limitations under the Act is five years, and it does
not begin to toll until the "misappropriation is discovered or by the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered."'29
Also under this code section, a continuing misappropriation
constitutes only a single claim, but separate claims may arise
against each individual who receives the trade secret from the one
who misappropriated it.' s°
IV. CONCLUSION
While the statutory language of each of the provisions governing
unfair competition and trade secrets are fairly straightforward, or,
in the instances where the language is vague, there is an appropri-
ate interpretation by the Georgia courts, the sheer multitude of the
provisions cause confusion and anxiety among those who need to
understand them. The fact that one cause of action does not
preclude another is, perhaps, the most important aspect of these
statutes. When brought together, it is likely a plaintiff with a
colorable argument will have success in attaining, at the very least,
a temporary injunction.
The unfair competition statutes were designed to protect the
mark owner's investment of time, creativity and money while also
ensuring that the consuming public is not lead astray by one
seeking to profit off of another's ingenuity and sweat. These
asserted goals of the state go a long way toward explaining the
relative ease, especially under the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, of obtaining relief. While it is not in the state's
interest to hamper competition, providing an open yet fair market
place is one of its primary goals. Thus, those who have been
operating under a certain name or mark may realize the benefit of
their years, and the newcomers are forced to break new ground
instead of treading on those who have come before them.




Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss1/7
GEORGIA'S STATE LAW PROTECTIONS
The same proposition can be said for the protection afforded
owners of trade secrets. Imagine the possible consequences if the
formula for Coca-Cola was released to the public or individuals
working in the soft drink industry; this formula has been closely
guarded for decades and with good reason. The potential value of
possessing the most coveted secrets of the soft drink industry is
impossible to estimate. It is extreme scenarios such as this that
help to emphasize the vital importance of having provisions to
protect the product of others. This is especially true when they
have invested time and effort into keeping the formula or plans a
secret, which is a prerequisite for being eligible for relief under the
Trade Secrets Act of 1990.
The recent efforts of the Georgia legislature to bring their trade
secret law in line with the majority of jurisdictions, speak volumes
on the recognized importance of trade secrets. The broader, more
inclusive defintion finally affords those who have suffered from the
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